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Multilateral development banks are frequently accused 
of “defensive lending,” the practice of extending new 
loans purely in order to ensure that existing loans are 
repaid.  This paper empirically examine this hypothesis 
using data on lending by and repayments to the 
International Development Association (IDA), which 
is the largest provider of concessional development 
loans to low-income countries.  The authors argue that 
key institutional features of IDA both (i) potentially 
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create incentives for defensive lending, and (ii) enable 
particularly sharp tests of the defensive lending 
hypothesis.  The authors find that there is a surprisingly 
robust partial correlation between disbursements on new 
IDA loans and repayments on existing loans.  However, a 
closer look at the evidence suggests that defensive lending 
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  Defensive lending refers to the practice of rolling over the debts of non-
creditworthy borrowers in order to prevent non-performing loans from showing up on 
creditors' balance sheets.  Commercial lenders may engage in (and their regulators may 
condone) such behavior if the explicit recognition of non-performing loans is financially 
(and politically) costly.  In recent years a number of critics have argued that multilateral 
development banks (MDBs) are also engaged in defensive lending. In short, these critics 
argue that an important motivation for fresh loans to developing countries is simply to 
ensure that existing loans are repaid.
1  Since countries with heavy debt service 
obligations may not necessarily be ones where aid resources will be effectively used, 
such behavior would not be consistent with the stated goals of MDBs to provide 
development finance to support growth and poverty alleviation.   
 
  This paper examines the empirical evidence for defensive lending by the 
International Development Association (IDA), the soft-loan window of the World Bank.  
Established in 1960, IDA provides highly-concessional loans to low-income countries, 
primarily financed by contributions from rich-country donors. The case of IDA is 
interesting for several reasons.  First, it is by far the largest single provider of 
concessional loans to developing countries, accounting for roughly half of all official 
lending to developing countries.  Second, because it relies heavily on regular donor 
contributions to finance the bulk of new lending, it has strong political incentives to 
demonstrate good performance on its existing portfolio.  
 
  Third, and perhaps most importantly, over the past 20 years the distribution of 
IDA lending across countries has been determined by an explicit formula tying per capita 
IDA allocations to per capita income, a measure of policy performance, and country size.  
This is important because this IDA allocation formula provides a baseline against which 
to assess defensive lending.  In the case of commercial lending, accepted standards of 
creditworthiness provide a natural benchmark against which to assess whether a loan is 
provided for defensive or valid reasons.
2  In contrast, much of foreign aid has been 
                                                 
1 See for example Bulow and Rogoff (2005) and Lerrick (2005). 
2 See for example Peek and Rosengren (2005) who document that Japanese banks provided 
loans to financially-troubled firms in order to prevent the realization of losses on the banks' own 
  1allocated according to a rather opaque combination of factors reflecting both the 
strategic and other interests of donors as well as the needs and capacity of recipient 
countries.
3  The lack of clear and measurable criteria for the allocation of aid means that 
it is difficult to distinguish development lending for defensive reasons from lending in 
support of other unstated objectives
4.   
 
  In the case of IDA, however, the IDA allocation formula provides a remarkably 
clear benchmark.  We begin by documenting empirically that around half of the variation 
in IDA commitments is explained by the three variables that explicitly enter into the IDA 
allocation formula: per capita GDP, a World Bank-constructed measure of policy 
performance, and population.  We then ask whether departures from the allocation 
formula are explained by measures of the debt burden of the borrowing country.  In 
particular, if defensive lending were operative, we should expect to see more lending to 
countries that have debt service obligations that are large relative to their repayment 
capacity.   We document that, after controlling for variables suggested by the IDA 
allocation formula,  there is a surprisingly strong partial correlation between new 
disbursements of IDA resources and repayments on outstanding IDA loans.  
 
  Nevertheless, we provide evidence that this partial correlation should not be 
interpreted as defensive lending, for at least four reasons:  (1) the observed correlation 
between disbursements and repayments is very strongly affected by a handful of 
countries entering into non-accrual status with IDA, with both repayments and 
disbursements on new loans falling sharply in tandem around these episodes  -- after 
removing these episodes from our sample the partical correlation between IDA 
disbursements and debt service obligations largely vanishes; (2) net transfers to even 
the most heavily-indebted countries are strongly positive, while the hypothesis of 
defensive lending suggests that they should be near zero; (3)  we find no evidence of 
greater disbursements in "large" debtors to IDA, whose repayment difficulties would 
                                                                                                                                                 
balance sheets.  This behaviour was more likely in banks that were close to their minimum capital 
adequacy requirements. 
3 Alesina and Dollar (2000), Rajan and Subramanian (2005). 
4 Such an unstated objective could, for example, be that multilateral creditors see their role as 
stabilizers of the global economic system and hence may deliberately forgo profits because they 
hope to see a country through a liquidity crisis that may have implications for the stability of the 
overall financial system (Jeanne and Zettelmeyer, 2001).  Or it could simply be that an important 
factor in driving foreign aid is the strategic and geopolitical ties between aid donors and aid 
recipients (Alesina and Dollar (2000), Rajan and Subramanian (2005)). 
  2presumably be more politically costly for IDA; and (4) there is no evidence of greater 
disbursements in countries with weak policy performance that are more likely to 
experience difficulties servicing a given debt burden.  Finally, we also document that 
there is little evidence that defensive lending may be done covertly by manipulation of 
variables that enter the IDA allocation formula itself. 
 
  We are not the first to study defensive lending behavior by multilateral lenders.  A 
number of prior papers have documented positive correlations between lending (either 
gross or net of repayments) and measures of indebtedness of the borrowing country 
(Birdsall, Claessens and Diwan (2003), Lerrick (2005), and Ratha (2005)).  Rather more 
mixed evidence is provided by Marchesi and Missale (2007) who document that net 
lending by multilaterals is negatively correlated with indebtedness to multilateral 
creditors in a sample of low-income countries, but less so for countries in the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief program.  As we discuss in more detail 
throughout the paper, we find that all of these studies suffer from one or both of two 
basic shortcomings:  (1) a failure to adequately control for common factors driving new 
lending and indebtedness that have nothing to do with defensive lending, and/or (2) a 
failure to eliminate purely mechanical sources of co-movement between new lending 
and indebtedness.  Both of these shortcomings lead to upward biases in estimates of 
defensive lending, as we discuss in more detail below.  Finally, a much more subtle test 
of defensive lending by a multilateral lender is offered by Celasun and Ramcharan 
(2006).  Rather than looking at correlations between repayments and new lending, these 
authors document evidence that lending by the International Monetary Fund is 
accompanied with less rigorous policy conditionality in countries where its exposure is 
high.  
 
  In Section 2 we describe in more detail the IDA allocation formula and show that 
it has strong predictive power for IDA lending.  In Section 3 we study the residual 
variation in this relationship, and document that it is strongly correlated with the 
indebtedness of the borrowing country.  However, we provide several arguments why 
this partial correlation should not be interpreted as evidence of defensive lending.  
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
  32.  Incentives for and Constraints on Defensive Lending by IDA 
 
  To see why IDA might face incentives to engage in defensive lending, some 
further institutional details are required.  IDA is set up as a rotating fund, in which new 
loans are financed by a combination of repayments of old loans (referred to as "reflows") 
and donor contributions.  Donor contributions primarily take the form of regular triennial 
"replenishments" of IDA resources.  The amounts of these contributions are negotiated 
and agreed upon by the donors following a review of the performance of past IDA 
lending.  Because IDA loans are highly concessional with very long maturities (standard 
IDA terms involve a grace period of 10 years followed by a 30 year repayment period), 
donor contributions have accounted for the bulk of IDA's financing since its creation in 
1960.  For example, between 2000 and 2006, donor contributions to IDA totalled $36.5 
billion, while repayments of IDA loans totalled just $8.1 billion.
5
 
  The administration and design of IDA lending is entrusted to the staff and 
management of the World Bank, and this work is financed by service charges that are 
proportional to the value of IDA credits extended.  Between 2001 and 2006, these 
service charges averaged $795 million and were roughly equal to the annual 
administrative expenses of IDA, which averaged $778 million over the same period.
6  
These service charges account for a very significant share of the operating budget of the 
combined operations of IDA and the non-concessional arm of the World Bank, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).  In particular, on 
average over the same period, service charges on IDA lending accounted for 46 percent 
of the combined administrative expenses of IDA and IBRD.   Thus, the World Bank staff 
who administer IDA resources have strong incentives to ensure the continuation of 
regular donor contributions to IDA, as well as regular reflows which can be re-lent. 
 
  The institutional dependence of the World Bank on IDA lending potentially 
creates incentives for defensive lending.  First, the willingness of donors to provide fresh 
resources during each IDA replenishment is likely to depend on their perception that 
                                                 
5 IDA Annual Report, Special Purpose Financial Statements, Statement of Cash Flows (various 
issues).  Donor contributions refer to direct contributions, as well as indirect contributions through 
the HIPC Trust Fund and from IBRD.   
6 IDA Annual Report, Special Purpose Financial Statements, Income Statement (various issues).  
Service charges refers to both service and commitment charges. 
  4these resources are being used well.  Ideally, this perception would be based on careful 
evaluations of the development impact of all IDA-financed projects.  But for many of the 
long-gestation projects that IDA resources finance, detecting quantifiable benefits even 
over the long term is difficult even when these projects are well-executed.  As a result, 
perceptions of the effective use of resources are likely to be heavily influenced by more 
readily-observable variables, such as the performance of the IDA portfolio.   A significant 
fraction of non-performing loans in IDA's portfolio could be interpreted as signaling the 
ineffective use of aid resources, and might lead donors to scale back their contributions 
to IDA.    
 
  Second, and closely related to the first, it is in the institutional interest of the 
World Bank to develop and maintain a steady stream of reflows into IDA.  As these 
reflows grow in importance over time they provide a predictable pool of resources that 
can be used to finance new IDA loans.  In contrast, triennial donor contributions to the 
IDA replenishments are less certain and are more subject to fluctuations in the political 
agendas of the donors.
7  To the extent that defensive lending can ensure repayments, 
and so demonstrate the viability of the IDA model of a rotating lending fund, there might 
be incentives to engage in such defensive lending. 
 
  Third and finally, rules governing IDA lending imply that the failure of a debtor 
country to make scheduled repayments triggers a prompt halt in new lending and 
disbursements on existing loans to that country.  Such interruptions in lending are highly 
disruptive to ongoing projects, and moreover contribute to difficult relationships between 
the World Bank and borrowing countries.  A desire to avoid such disruptions might also 
create incentives for defensive lending.  Of course this last consideration is not unique to 
IDA, but nevertheless may contribute to incentives for defensive lending in the case of 
IDA. 
 
  Set against these potential incentives for defensive lending is another key feature 
of IDA:  its explicit formula for the allocation of resources across countries.  As noted in 
                                                 
7 See for example "Hungry Like the Wolf", Economist (December 7, 2006) which describes 
negotiations over IDA replenishments as a "begathon" and a "fraught business".  The recent 
controversy over World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz and the suggestions from various donors 
that they would withhold contributions to IDA in response further illustrate the riskiness (from the 
standpoint of the World Bank) of relying solely on replenishments as a source of financing for 
IDA. 
  5the introduction we will use this formula as a benchmark against which to assess the 
importance of defensive lending:  in particular we will examine whether deviations from 
this formula are correlated with measures of the indebtedness of borrowing countries.  
We describe this formula in some detail as it provides justification for the set of control 
variables used in our subsequent empirical work.
8  This formula, known as the 
"Performance Based Allocation" formula (PBA), is used to determine an initial allocation 
of available IDA resources across IDA-eligible countries, known as the "normative 
allocation".  Eligibility for IDA is based on per capita GNP, where the current threshold 
for eligibility is $1025 US at market exchange rates.  In addition, a number of small 
countries with per capita incomes higher than this threshold are included based on the 
"Small Island Economy" exception.   The PBA then delivers the "normative allocation" of 
IDA resources across eligible countries based on the following formula: 
 
(1)   ( ) ( )
φ − α ⋅ ⋅ = ct ct t ct Income Capita Per Policy A Allocation Capita Per  
 
where Per Capita Allocation refers to the PBA of new IDA resources to country c in year 
t; Policy is an index of borrower policy performance; Per Capita Income is per capita 
GDP measured at market exchange rates;  α and φ are positive constants measuring the 
elasticity of IDA allocations to policy and the level of development of the country
9; and At 
is a constant (across countries) that is chosen to ensure that total allocations across all 
countries exhaust IDA resources available for lending in the period.   
 
  Several remarks are in order about this formula.   
 
•  The PBA given by this formula is not the same as disbursements or even 
commitments of new loans to a country during the three-year IDA period, as 
there are a variety of steps between these allocations and actual new lending to 
countries.  First, the normative allocations produced by the PBA are discussed 
and adjusted by the management of IDA to reflect a variety of considerations.  
This results in a set of "agreed allocations" by country.  These are then 
aggregated by regions and the total agreed allocations are made available to 
                                                 
8 For a much more detailed description of the PBA and empirical evidence on the extent to which 
it in practice guides IDA lending, see Moorty and Orzan (2007). 
9 These weights have varied over time, and in recent years have been α=2 and φ=0.125. 
  6each regional vice-presidency in the World Bank.  Each vice presidency then 
develops a lending program based on these resources, with some discretion on 
how they are allocated across countries within the region.  Given normal lags in 
project and loan preparation, as well as a typical disbursement period of eight to 
ten years for IDA credits, there are considerable lags between the initial 
normative allocation of resources given by this formula and actual disbursements 
of funds to borrowers.  Even in terms of commitments, regions have some 
flexibility in shifting IDA commitments over time in order to respond to shocks, or 
to accommodate large and indivisible lending projects. 
 
•  Even for initial normative IDA allocations, this formula does not hold exactly for 
several additional reasons.  The main ones are that (a) there are lower and upper 
limits on allocations, with each IDA-eligible country receiving a minimum total 
allocation of 3 million SDRs, and a maximum per capita allocation of $US 20, and 
(b) special adjustments to the allocations for "blend" countries that are eligible for 
borrowing from both IDA as well as non-concessional IBRD lending. 
•  There have been non-trivial changes in the precise measure of policy used in the 
PBA system.  The CPIA ratings, prepared by World Bank country economists, 
were initiated for the specific reason of guiding concessional lending by IDA (and 
also for a while non-concessional IBRD lending as well).  The CPIA methodology 
itself has evolved over time into its current format of ratings assigned on a scale 
of one to six for 16 different criteria that are then averaged to obtain the overall 
CPIA index.
10  The policy measure actually used in the PBA formula has also 
evolved, to (a) include measures of procurement and portfolio performance on 
individual IDA loans, and (b) place greater weight on the dimensions of the CPIA 
that measure "governance". 
•  The formula itself has undergone various changes at the request of IDA donors.  
For example, during the 1990s some discontinuities were introduced to increase 
the exponent on policy in countries with good policy performance, thus increasing 
the sensitivity of IDA allocations to good policy performance. 
 
                                                 
10 Details on the current form of the CPIA can be found at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/CPIA2005Questionnaire.pdf 
  7  Since  Equation (2) is linear in logarithms, our baseline empirical specification 
has the log of IDA disbursements per capita as the dependent variable, and the set of 
control variables includes the logarithm of per capita GDP in dollars at market exchange 
rates, the logarithm of policy, and a full set of year dummies.  We have obtained the 
precise measure of policy actually used in IDA allocations since 1990, whose definition 
has varied over time as noted above.  Prior to 1990 we simply use the CPIA itself, which 
was in fact the measure of policy performance used by IDA during this time.   The year 
dummies capture the growth over time in the overall size of IDA, i.e. increases in At in 
Equation (2).   We include the logarithm of population to capture the strong relationship 
between country size and IDA allocations per capita that is introduced by the minimum 
and maximum per capita IDA allocations described above.  Finally, the error term in 
these benchmark regressions captures empirical deviations from the PBA formula.  In 
the next section we will examine the extent to which these deviations are driven by 
defensive lending considerations. 
 
  Table 1 reports the results from estimating these benchmark IDA allocation 
regressions.  In the first column, the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
disbursements on IDA loans per capita.  We pool all country-year observations over the 
20-year period 1984-2003, and as noted above we include year dummies to capture the 
overall size of the IDA envelope in each year.  All three variables are highly significant 
predictors of IDA disbursements and enter with the expected signs, with higher per 
capita incomes and higher population associated with smaller per capita IDA allocations, 
and better policy performance associated with larger per capita IDA allocations.  The 
overall fit of the regression, as summarized by the R-squared, is a respectable 0.33, 
indicating that the variables entering the IDA allocation formula do explain a significant 
share of the variation in actual IDA disbursements. 
 
  In the second column we repeat the results, but replacing the dependent variable 
with log IDA commitments per capita.  This choice of dependent variable is more 
appropriate from the standpoint of assessing  the empirical performance of the PBA 
formula, as the PBA governs commitments of new loans, while disbursements in a given 
year reflect commitments, and hence PBA ratings, over the past several years.  Not 
surprisingly, in this case we find a substantially higher R-squared of 0.5, and a pattern of 
significance of coefficients that is quite similar to the previous column.   Nevertheless, for 
  8most of the paper we will use disbursements per capita as the key dependent variable, 
since from the standpoint of defensive lending, only actual disbursements in a given year 
can be used to finance debt service obligations falling due during that period, and so 
only disbursements can be used to implement a strategy of defensive lending.
11  
 
  In the next two columns we divide the time period in half and report results 
separately for the period 1984-1993 and 1994-2003.  The main distinction between 
these two periods is that the magnitude and significance of the effect of policy 
performance increases sharply in the latter period, with the coefficient nearly doubling in 
size.  This captures the greater policy selectivity in IDA's lending in recent years 
compared with earlier ones.   Interestingly, the estimated magnitude of the elasticities of 
per capita IDA allocations to policy and per capita income are quite close to those in the 
stated formula.  The estimated elasticity with respect to per capita income is -0.23 and 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that it is equal to the value currently used in the 
PBA formula, which is -0.125.  Similarly, the estimated elasticity with respect to policy is 
1.47 and we do not reject the null hypothesis that it is equal to its current PBA value of 2 
(at the 5 percent significance level). 
 
  In the last column of Table 1 we report results including country dummies, so as 
to ascertain the extent to which the IDA allocation formula explains the within-country 
over-time variation in disbursements on IDA loans.  In these regressions we drop the per 
capita income and population variables as they exhibit virtually no variation within 
countries over time relative to their cross-country variation.  We continue to find a highly 
significant relationship between the measure of policy performance and IDA 
disbursements, and the magnitude of the elasticity at 1.26 is very similar to what we 
found in the pooled between and cross-country variation in the data.  This finding is quite 
striking as it indicates that the PBA formula predicts very well not only the between-




                                                 
11 We do however note that our results below are quite similar if we look at commitments rather 
than disbursements.  We also obtain broadly similar results with a Tobit specification to deal with 
the significant number of zeros in the commitments variable (about 1/3 of the sample, as opposed 
to less than 10 percent of the sample in the case of the disbursements variable). 
  93.  Testing for Defensive Lending by IDA 
 
  We begin our tests for defensive lending by augmenting the basic regressions in 
Table 1 with measures of IDA's exposure to each country.  If defensive lending 
considerations in part motivate IDA lending, we should expect to find a positive 
correlation between measures of indebtedness of the borrowing country and 
disbursements of IDA credits.  In particular, we would expect to find that, other things 
equal, countries with heavier debt burdens or larger debt service obligations to IDA 
would receive greater disbursements on new loans. 
 
  We consider two alternative measures of borrowers' indebtedness:  total debt 
service paid to IDA in a given year, and the year-end total stock of IDA debt outstanding, 
both expressed as a share of the GDP of the borrowing country.
12  We lag the stock of 
debt variable by one year to remove a purely mechanical source of correlation between 
the two:  new disbursements of IDA loans in a given year imply an increase in the stock 
of debt outstanding at the end of the same year.
13   Also, we enter both debt variables in 
logarithms, for two practical reasons.  First, this allows us to interpret the estimated 
slope coefficients as elasticities, since the dependent variable is also in logarithms.  
Second, due to a few countries with very high debt stocks and debt service obligations, 
the unconditional relationship between IDA lending and these variables is highly non-
linear.  In logarithms however the relationship is much closer to linear, and the estimated 
slope coefficients are much less sensitive to extreme observations in the sample. 
 
  In the first two columns of Table 2 we in turn add the total stock of IDA debt 
outstanding, and the current flow of debt service paid to IDA, as explanatory variables in 
the simple pooled regressions.  Both enter very highly significantly and positively, 
                                                 
12 One might also examine whether IDA engages in defensive lending vis-a-vis other creditors.  In 
this case, one could ask whether measures of total debt service or indebtedness vis-a-vis all 
creditors, and not just IDA, is significantly correlated with IDA repayments.  In unreported results 
we have investigated this, and we find that typically, measures of overall indebtedness are much 
less significantly correlated with IDA lending. 
13 Somewhat surprisingly this potential source of mechanical correlation between stock of debt 
measures and disbursements is not recognized by all authors in this literature.  For example, 
Birdsall, Claessens and Diwan (2003) regress net transfers on loans from official creditors on the 
contemporaneous present value of future debt service obligations.  Since the latter is an end-of-
period measure and the former measures the flow of new lending during the period, there is a 
mechanical source of positive correlation between the two which biases up estimates of 
defensive lending. 
  10indicating that higher indebtedness to IDA as captured by either of these two measures, 
is associated with significantly higher disbursements of IDA loans.  The estimated 
magnitudes are also non-trivial.  In the case of the stock of debt, a 10-percent increase 
in the IDA debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a 3.9 percent increase in per capita IDA 
disbursements, and a 10 percent increase in the IDA debt service-to-GDP ratio is 
associated with a 3.1 percent increase in per capita disbursements.  In the next two 
columns of Table 2 we examine the within-country relationships by adding country fixed 
effects and as before dropping per capita income and country size.  This greatly reduces 
the magnitude and significance of the estimated coefficients on the indebtedness 
variables.  The coefficient on the stock of debt measure falls by two-thirds and is now 
significant only at the 10 percent level.   The coefficient on the debt service variable falls 
by one-third but remains highly significant at the one percent level.   
 
  Since as we discuss below this is a key benchmark finding, we report in Figure 1 
the partial scatter corresponding to this relationship, and we verify that it is not driven by 
a few visually-obvious extreme observations.  The remaining columns of Table 2 split the 
sample in half at 1994 and report results for the debt service variable.  We find that both 
with and without country fixed effects, the estimated coefficient on debt service is 
significantly positive in both sub-periods, although substantially larger in the first period 
than in the second period.   
 
  It is useful to pause for a moment to emphasize why the results in Table 2 are 
quite remarkable.  Observing a simple correlation between disbursements on IDA loans 
and either of our measures of country indebtedness to IDA would not be very surprising.  
If some countries have persistently good policy performance, they would attract lots of 
IDA lending and so end up with large stocks of debt owed to IDA as well as large debt 
service obligations.  At the same time, persistent good policy performance would make 
them candidates for continued high volumes of lending.  Thus it would be perfectly 
natural to observe a positive unconditional correlation between either of our two 
measures of indebtedness and disbursements on IDA loans, as this correlation would be 
driven by a third factor, persistent cross-country differences in policy performance.   And 
similarly, we might expect countries that are small, or have low per capita incomes, to be 
persistent recipients of IDA lending and so display a positive unconditional correlation 
between indebtedness and disbursements on new IDA loans.  For this reason, we do not 
  11think that the unconditional correlation between lending and repayments documented by 
Lerrick (2005) is at all compelling evidence of defensive lending.  We note also that 
Ratha (2005) does find some evidence of a correlation between IDA commitments as a 
share of GDP and the total debt service obligations of borrowing countries.  However, 
these regressions do not control for policy performance, per capita income, and 
population.  The persistent-over-time component of these variables will drive both new 
lending and repayments on existing loans, and so we cannot interpret this correlation as 
evidence of defensive lending.   
 
  This is precisely why we have emphasized the unique role of the PBA formula in 
the IDA allocation process, as it provides us with an explicit institutional justification for a 
particular set of control variables that drive lending decisions and so allows us to control 
for these omitted variables in the unconditional relationship.  And despite having done 
so, and despite the strong explanatory power of the PBA variables, we find a strongly 
significant relationship between indebtedness and new disbursements conditional upon 
these variables.  Moreover, we have seen that for the debt service variable at least, this 
significant relationship survives the inclusion of country fixed effects, which can be 
interpreted as controlling for any unobserved (by us) but time-invariant dimensions of 




  The foregoing discussion also suggests a reason to focus more closely on the 
partial correlation between disbursements and debt service paid rather than the stock of 
debt outstanding.  The reason has to do with the fairly long disbursement periods as well 
as the long grace periods associated with IDA credits.  A typical IDA credit, once agreed 
upon, is disbursed over a multi-year period, typically between five and eight years, and 
standard IDA credits also have a grace period of 10 years during which no repayments 
are made.   The multiple-year disbursement schedule implies that disbursements we 
observe at year t to a given borrowing country reflect lending decisions made, and the 
information available regarding the borrower, over the past several years.  And similarly, 
                                                 
14 Of course there is also a less-than-benign interpretation of these unobserved time-invariant 
country characteristics.  It could be that past lending and current disbursements are driven the by 
strategic and/or geopolitical characteristics of borrowing countries.  We have investigated this 
possibility by controlling for the politically-motivated component of overall aid flows as constructed 
by Rajan and Subramanian (2005).  We do not however find that this particular variable has much 
explanatory power for IDA disbursements. 
  12the stock of debt at the end of year t-1 reflects lending decisions and the information on 
which they are based, over the past several years and more.
15  To the extent that 
lending decisions are made based on policy or other factors not explicitly captured by 
the PBA, this overlap in information sets implies that we might very well observe positive 
partial correlations between the stock of debt measure and new IDA disbursements.  In 
contrast, the 10-year grace period in IDA credits means that any debt service that we 
observe in year t reflects lending decisions, and the information upon which they were 
based, from 10 or more years prior to t.  This makes it much less likely to observe a 
correlation between debt service paid to IDA and new disbursements from IDA driven by 
common (but unobserved by us) policy factors.  In light of this, in the discussion that 
follows we focus on the debt service variable, which in any case is much more 
significantly correlated with new disbursements.
 16
 
  Thus far we have seen that there is a surprisingly strong and significant partial 
correlation between measures of indebtedness to IDA and disbursements on new IDA 
loans.  We have also argued that it is difficult to justify this relationship by arguing that 
there are unobserved cross-country and over-time fluctuations in policy performance or 
factors that make countries good candidates for IDA lending but are not explicitly 
captured in the PBA formula.  At first glance this evidence might suggest that defensive 
lending considerations are operative for IDA:  controlling for the ostensible determinants 
of IDA allocations, countries that are more indebted to IDA and/or have greater debt 
service obligations to IDA get greater disbursements of IDA loans.  Nevertheless, we 
think that there are four reasons that this defensive lending interpretation of these results 
is probably not appropriate. 
                                                 
15 This potential source of mechanical correlation between disbursements and debt stocks 
coming through long disbursement periods potentially biases up the correlations between net 
lending and debt stocks reported in Birdsall, Claessens and Diwan (2003) and Marchesi and 
Missale (2007). 
16 We note in passing that other papers such as Birdsall, Claessens and Diwan (2003) have 
focused on stock-of-debt rather than flow-of-debt-service measures of indebtedness and so are 
subject to this source of upward bias.  In contrast Ratha (2005) in our view appropriately focuses 
on flow measures of debt service.  We also note that in our specifications, the left-hand and right-
hand side variables of interest are normalized by different factors:  we have IDA disbursements 
per capita as the dependent variable and debt service as a share of GDP as the key right-hand 
side variable of interest.  In contrast, all three papers mentioned above normalize both sides by 
GDP.  To the extent that there is measurement error in the denominator, this raises the risk of a 
mechanical source of positive comovement between disbursements as a share of GDP and 
measures of indebtedness as a share of GDP, again resulting in upward biases in estimates of 
defensive lending. 
  13 
  First, we observe that the significance of the relationship between debt service 
paid and disbursements is largely driven by a handful of countries entering and exiting 
non-accrual status with IDA.  In our sample there are a few cases of countries that go 
into non-accrual status with IDA.  This occurs more or less automatically if scheduled 
debt service payments to IDA are late by more than sixty days, and this in turn more or 
less automatically triggers a halt to disbursements on IDA lending.  Conversely, exits 
from non-accrual status generally involve a significant payment of debt service including 
past arrears, combined with a resumption of disbursements.  Episodes such as these 
will thus naturally feature a positive correlation between disbursements and repayments.  
Figure 2 illustrates one such episode in our sample.  Around the time of the 1994 
genocide, Rwanda briefly entered, and then exited from non-accrual status with IDA (the 
period indicated with a gray rectangle).  Around this time per capita disbursements and 
debt service as a share of GDP both fell sharply and then recovered quickly afterwards, 
generating a strong positive correlation between the two measures.
17  
 
  We note first that these episodes are rare.  In the full set of 1687 country-year 
observations on IDA-eligible countries between 1984 and 2003 we find that 154 
observations, or slightly less than 10 percent of the sample, correspond to countries in 
non-accrual status, with most of these observations are concentrated in a handful of 
countries.   For our purposes the within-country over-time fluctuations in non-accrual 
status are relevant.  In our regression sample we have just 14 cases of countries 
entering non-accrual status and 14 cases of countries exiting, yet it turns out that these 
cases are highly influential in driving the partial correlation between debt service paid 
and new disbursements.
18  To see this we construct a dummy variable taking on the 
value of one in country j in year t if a country entered into or exited from non-accrual 
status in years t-1, t or t+1.  We then interact this dummy variable with total debt service 
and enter it into our baseline regressions, thus allowing the slope of the relationship 
between debt service and disbursements to differ in these episodes from the rest of the 
                                                 
17 Note that disbursements on an annual basis do not fall to zero as Rwanda entered non-accrual 
status near the end of the 2003 and exited again in early 2004, so that it did not spend a full 
calendar year in non-accrual status. 
18 This is smaller than the total number of entries into and exits from nonaccrual status because 
our regression sample is restricted to observations where debt service and disbursements are 
both positive (since both variables are entered as logarithms).  We thus do not have in our 
regression sample episodes of nonaccrual status that lead to complete halts in disbursements.  
  14sample.  The results are reported in the first two columns of Table 3.  In the first column 
we repeat our baseline regression of disbursements on policy performance and total 
debt service, including a full set of country and year dummies, but restricting ourselves 
to the slightly smaller sample for which we have data on changes in non-accrual 
status.
19  As before we find a significant partial correlation between debt service and 
disbursements.  In the second column however we add our interaction with changes in 
non-accrual status.  We find that this interactive effect is highly significant, while the 
direct effect of debt service is no longer significant.  This indicates that the significant 
correlation between debt service and disbursements that we have seen thus far is driven 
primarily by the handful of countries entering in or exiting from non-accrual status. 
 
  An obvious objection to this is finding that exits from non-accrual status may 
precisely constitute defensive lending.  According to this objection, countries exiting from 
non-accrual status are able to make the required payments of debt service (and possibly 
also accumulated arrears) precisely because they are receiving new disbursements. To 
address this objection we further distinguish between entries and exits, interacting the 
debt service variable with separate dummy variables indicating countries entering into or 
exiting from nonaccrual status.  We report this regression in the third column of Table 3, 
where we find that the partial correlation between debt service and disbursements is 
significantly positive only around episodes of countries entering into non-accrual status.  
In contrast, the correlation is insignificant in countries exiting from non-accrual status as 
well as in the remainder of the sample.  We conclude from this that most of the observed 
partial correlation between debt service and disbursements is driven by abrupt declines 
in lending and repayments in a few countries going into non-accrual status, and thus 
should not be interpreted as evidence of defensive lending. 
 
  Second, we observe that the estimated magnitude of the response of 
disbursements to debt service is implausibly large under the hypothesis of defensive 
lending.  Defensive lending implies that lending to non-creditworthy borrowers should be 
tailored to just cover the debt service obligations of the borrower.  There is no reason 
however why the lender should lend significantly more than the amount of debt service 
owed to it by a non-creditworthy borrower.  However, a striking feature of IDA in this 
                                                 
19 Our dummy variable for non-accrual status spans the period 1984-2003.  We thus have data on 
changes in non-accrual status only for 1985-2003. 
  15respect is that net transfers, i.e. the difference between disbursements on new loans and 
repayments of old loans, is strongly positive for virtually all active IDA borrowers.  This 
can be seen most clearly in Figure 3, which reports net transfers on IDA loans (i.e. 
disbursements less debt service paid) as a share of GDP, averaging by decile of IDA 
debt service as a share of GDP.  If defensive lending were important, we would expect 
to see net transfers be close to zero in countries with the heaviest debt service 
obligations (i.e. towards the right-hand-side of Figure 3.  However, we see that net 
transfers are positive on average for all deciles of the distribution of IDA debt service.  
Moreover, net transfers are (weakly) increasing with IDA debt service ratios, whereas 
the defensive lending hypothesis would suggest the relationship should be negative. 
 
  Another way to see this is to notice that our estimated response of 
disbursements to debt service implies that the response of new disbursements greatly 
exceed debt service due.  Recall that both variables are entered in logarithms so that the 
estimated slope coefficient is an elasticity.  Converting this into absolute changes implies 
that a one-dollar increase in debt service is associated with an increase in 
disbursements of (β Disbursements/Debt Service) dollars, where β is the estimated 
slope coefficient which ranges from about 0.2 to 0.3.   Thus in any country where the 
ratio of disbursements to debt service is greater than between 3.33=1/0.3 and 5=1/0.2, 
our estimates suggest that new disbursements are much greater than what would be 
required for purely defensive lending purposes.  In our sample, the 25th percentile of the 
ratio of disbursements to debt service is 4.5, suggesting that in roughly three-quarters of 
all countries the absolute magnitude of the response of new disbursements to debt 
service due is larger than would be warranted if defensive lending were operative. 
 
  Third, we do not find evidence that the correlation between debt service and 
disbursements is stronger in countries that account for a large share of IDA's portfolio.  
The intuition for this point is simple:  if defensive lending were operative, we would 
expect IDA to have a stronger incentive to engage in defensive lending in countries that 
loom large in its own portfolio, since presumably the political and financial costs of 
explicitly recognizing non-performance would be greater in such large borrowing 
countries.  To capture this possibility, we construct a variable measuring the rank of 
  16each country in IDA's portfolio of loans outstanding in each year.
20  We then interact this 
with the debt service variable and introduce it in the benchmark regressions without and 
with country fixed effects.   We report these results in the fourth and fifth columns of 
Table 3.  Surprisingly, we find that the interaction term enters negatively and 
significantly, suggesting that the partial correlation between debt service and 
disbursements is significantly higher among smaller borrowers.  We think this pattern is 
difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis of defensive lending.
21
 
  Fourth and finally, we do not find that the correlation between debt service and 
disbursements is greater in countries with poor policy performance.  The argument here 
too is straightforward.  Thus far we have been assuming that high debt service to GDP 
ratios indicate borrowers that are likely to have difficulties servicing their debts, and thus 
are likely to be candidates for defensive lending.  Recent research however has 
documented that in addition to high debt burden indicators, the quality of a country's 
policy and institutional performance as measured by the CPIA has strong predictive 
power for episodes of debt servicing difficulties (Kraay and Nehru (2006)).  In the 
present context this suggests a further interactive effect:  if defensive lending were 
important, we should expect to find that the partial correlation between debt service and 
disbursements is higher in countries with poor policy performance.  To investigate this 
we create a dummy variable taking on the value one if a country's CPIA score is greater 
than 3.5, which is roughly the median CPIA score in the entire regression sample.   We 
then interact this with debt service and include the interaction in our baseline regressions 
with and without country fixed effects (columns 6 and 7 of Table 3).  Although this 
interaction enters negative as would be expected under the hypothesis of defensive 
lending, it is insignificantly different from zero.
22   
                                                 
20 We use this rank variable as a measure of size because the distribution of shares in the IDA 
portfolio is highly skewed with a few large borrowers such as China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan 
and Nigeria accounting for a large share of IDA credits outstanding. 
21 In contrast, using the same rank measure of debtor size, Depetris and Kraay (2007) do find 
some suggestive evidence that debt relief (from all sources) is more likely to go to low-income 
countries that are larger borrowers (vis-a-vis all multilateral lenders). 
22 The work of Birdsall, Claessens, and Diwan (2003) suggests another interpretation of this 
interaction.  They document that net transfers from official creditors are negatively correlated with 
the CPIA measure policy performance in countries that are highly-indebted to multilateral 
creditors.  This would correspond to a negative interactive effect that we find here.  Their 
interpretation however focuses on "policy selectivity", arguing that aid donors are less selective in 
the allocation of development loans to countries with high levels of debt.  However we do not find 
  17 
  The evidence thus far suggests that while there is a significantly positive partial 
correlation between disbursements on IDA lending and debt service paid to IDA, we do 
not think that this correlation should be interpreted as evidence of defensive lending.  
There is however a further possibility for defensive lending:  it is possible that defensive 
lending is not done overtly, by increasing disbursements beyond what is prescribed by 
the PBA formula to countries with incipient debt servicing difficulties. Rather it could be 
done more covertly through manipulation of the variables driving PBA allocations.
23  In 
particular, it is possible that defensive lending is accomplished by giving better-than-
warranted CPIA scores to countries with incipient debt servicing difficulties.  This would 
result in higher-than-warranted commitments and eventual disbursements to the country, 
but yet would not evidence itself as a significant partial correlation between 
disbursements and debt service after controlling for policy performance.  
 
  A simple way to test for this possibility is to examine whether measures of 
country indebtedness have predictive power for IDA country performance ratings after 
controlling for other measures of policy performance.  We do this in Table 4, where we 
use data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators project (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2006)) as alternative measures of policy performance.  We consider two of 
the six measures from this dataset, Rule of Law, and Government Effectiveness, as 
ones that correspond most closely to what the IDA country performance ratings are 
measuring.
24  Although these indicators have the advantage of covering all IDA 
borrowers, they have a more limited time dimension and are available only 1996, 1998, 
2000, and annually since 2002.   We then report results of pooled and fixed-effects 
regressions in this shorter panel, including in turn the stock of IDA debt and the flow of 
IDA debt service as proxies for incipient debt servicing difficulties that might be met with 
                                                                                                                                                 
this interaction to be statistically significant, possibly because we consider a much larger sample 
of IDA recipients and not simply the set of African countries that they study. 
23 This approach is closely related to that of Celasun and Ramcharan (2006) who study whether 
the IMF dilutes its lending standards by imposing weaker program conditions or by waiving 
conditions for countries whose obligations outstanding to the IMF represent a bigger share of the 
institution’s overall balance sheet.  They find this type of dilution is present in loans financed by 
the IMF's own resources, where incentives for defensive lending are stronger. 
24 The WGI indicators are composite indicators averaging information on perceptions of 
governance and institutional quality from a large number of distinct respondents.  One of the 
ingredients of the WGI is the CPIA itself, which contributes to the strong correlation between the 
IDA policy performance measure and the WGI indicators.  This however does not affect the 
interpretation of the coefficients on the indebtedness variables. 
  18defensive lending-type behavior.  The evidence here is uniformly negative:  we find no 
cases where the debt burden indicators have any significant explanatory power for IDA 
country performance ratings, suggesting that defensive lending is not operating through 
this indirect channel. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
  Multilateral development lenders are frequently accused of defensive lending in 
order to ensure repayment of loans outstanding.  In this paper we have studied the 
extent to which lending by IDA, by far the largest source of concessional development 
loans, is motivated by defensive lending.  We have argued that the strong institutional 
dependence of the World Bank, which administers IDA on behalf of donors, creates 
potential incentives for defensive lending.  Moreover, the unique institutional features of 
IDA, and particularly its formulaic system of policy-based loan allocations across 
countries, provides a particularly clean basis for testing this hypothesis.  We have seen 
that, conditional on the variables that notionally drive IDA allocations, per capita income, 
population, and policy performance, there remains a strong partial correlation between 
measures of indebtedness to IDA and new disbursements on IDA loans.  This 
relationship, which is suggestive of defensive lending, holds even when we control for all 
unobserved, time-invariant country characteristics through the use of fixed effects. 
 
  Nevertheless, we have argued that this partial correlation should not be 
interpreted as evidence for defensive lending, for at least four reasons:  (1) the observed 
correlation between disbursements and repayments is very strongly affected by a 
handful of countries entering into non-accrual status with IDA, with both repayments and 
disbursements on new loans falling sharply in tandem around these episodes; (2) net 
transfers to even the most heavily-indebted countries are strongly positive, while the 
hypothesis of defensive lending suggests that they should be near zero; (3)  we find no 
evidence of greater disbursements in "large" debtors to IDA, whose repayment 
difficulties would presumably be more politically costly for IDA; and (4) there is no 
evidence of greater disbursements in countries with weak policy performance that are 
more likely to experience difficulties servicing a given debt burden. 
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Figure 1:  Partial Scatter of Fixed-Effects Relationship Between  
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Figure 3:  Net Transfers by IDA, By Decile of Debt Service/GDP 
 


























































Decile of Total IDA Debt Service/G
 
 
 
 
23 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
:
 
 
I
D
A
 
A
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
 
 
(
1
)
 
(
2
)
 
(
3
)
 
(
4
)
 
(
5
)
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
l
o
g
(
D
i
s
b
u
r
s
e
-
 
m
e
n
t
s
/
C
a
p
i
t
a
)
 
l
o
g
(
C
o
m
m
i
t
-
m
e
n
t
s
/
C
a
p
i
t
a
)
 
l
o
g
(
D
i
s
b
u
r
s
e
-
 
m
e
n
t
s
/
C
a
p
i
t
a
)
 
l
o
g
(
D
i
s
b
u
r
s
e
-
 
m
e
n
t
s
/
C
a
p
i
t
a
)
 
l
o
g
(
D
i
s
b
u
r
s
e
-
 
m
e
n
t
s
/
C
a
p
i
t
a
)
 
T
i
m
e
 
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
l
o
g
(
G
D
P
 
P
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
)
 
-
0
.
2
9
8
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
0
8
7
 
-
0
.
5
0
8
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
2
3
5
*
*
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
9
7
)
 
(
0
.
0
5
8
)
 
(
0
.
1
4
6
)
 
(
0
.
1
1
0
)
 
 
l
o
g
(
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
)
 
-
0
.
3
1
5
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
4
5
6
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
3
6
9
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
2
7
8
*
*
*
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
4
6
)
 
(
0
.
0
2
6
)
 
(
0
.
0
5
6
)
 
(
0
.
0
5
0
)
 
 
l
o
g
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
 
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
)
 
1
.
1
4
9
*
*
*
 
0
.
7
5
6
*
*
*
 
0
.
7
7
8
*
*
*
 
1
.
4
6
9
*
*
*
 
1
.
2
6
0
*
*
*
 
 
(
0
.
1
9
2
)
 
(
0
.
1
1
2
)
 
(
0
.
2
5
8
)
 
(
0
.
2
5
9
)
 
(
0
.
1
8
8
)
 
Y
e
a
r
 
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
e
s
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
1
2
0
0
 
9
0
9
 
5
2
0
 
6
8
0
 
1
2
2
7
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
8
2
 
8
2
 
6
8
 
7
8
 
8
3
 
R
-
S
q
u
a
r
e
d
 
0
.
3
2
8
 
0
.
4
9
8
 
0
.
3
7
4
 
0
.
3
1
7
 
0
.
5
8
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
O
L
S
.
 
 
H
e
t
e
r
o
s
k
e
d
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
-
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
e
n
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
 
(
*
*
)
 
(
*
*
*
)
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
1
0
%
 
(
5
%
)
 
(
1
%
)
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
 
 
 
 
2
4 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
2
:
 
 
D
e
b
t
,
 
D
e
b
t
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
I
D
A
 
L
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
l
o
g
(
D
i
s
b
u
r
s
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
p
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
)
 
 
 
(
1
)
 
(
2
)
 
(
3
)
 
(
4
)
 
(
5
)
 
(
6
)
 
(
7
)
 
(
8
)
 
T
i
m
e
 
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
4
-
 
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
4
-
 
2
0
0
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
l
o
g
(
G
D
P
 
P
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
)
 
0
.
1
8
0
*
 
0
.
0
9
4
 
 
 
0
.
2
0
9
 
-
0
.
0
0
9
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
1
0
8
)
 
(
0
.
1
1
5
)
 
 
 
(
0
.
1
6
7
)
 
(
0
.
1
1
7
)
 
 
 
l
o
g
(
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
)
 
-
0
.
1
9
9
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
2
3
4
*
*
*
 
 
 
-
0
.
2
1
6
*
*
*
 
-
0
.
2
2
8
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
3
6
)
 
(
0
.
0
4
1
)
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
4
2
)
 
(
0
.
0
5
2
)
 
 
 
l
o
g
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
 
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
)
 
1
.
0
1
8
*
*
*
 
0
.
8
7
9
*
*
*
 
1
.
2
5
0
*
*
*
 
1
.
0
4
6
*
*
*
 
0
.
5
2
2
*
*
*
 
1
.
1
9
9
*
*
*
 
0
.
7
2
9
*
*
*
 
0
.
9
9
2
*
*
*
 
(
0
.
1
6
8
)
 
(
0
.
1
7
9
)
 
(
0
.
1
8
8
)
 
(
0
.
1
8
4
)
 
(
0
.
1
5
8
)
 
(
0
.
2
5
8
)
 
(
0
.
2
5
1
)
 
(
0
.
2
2
1
)
 
l
o
g
(
I
D
A
 
D
e
b
t
 
O
u
t
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
/
G
D
P
)
 
0
.
3
8
9
*
*
*
 
 
0
.
1
2
5
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
6
0
)
 
 
(
0
.
0
7
1
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
l
o
g
(
T
o
t
a
l
 
I
D
A
 
D
e
b
t
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
/
G
D
P
)
 
 
0
.
3
0
6
*
*
*
 
 
0
.
2
2
2
*
*
*
 
0
.
5
5
9
*
*
*
 
0
.
1
7
0
*
*
*
 
0
.
2
6
8
*
 
0
.
1
7
9
*
*
*
 
 
(
0
.
0
6
4
)
 
 
(
0
.
0
8
4
)
 
(
0
.
0
8
7
)
 
(
0
.
0
6
1
)
 
(
0
.
1
5
3
)
 
(
0
.
0
7
8
)
 
Y
e
a
r
 
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
1
1
7
0
 
1
1
3
7
 
1
1
7
2
 
1
1
3
7
 
4
7
1
 
6
6
6
 
4
7
1
 
6
6
6
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
8
1
 
8
0
 
8
1
 
8
0
 
6
1
 
7
6
 
6
1
 
7
6
 
R
-
S
q
u
a
r
e
d
 
0
.
4
3
0
 
0
.
4
1
1
 
0
.
5
8
7
 
0
.
6
3
0
 
0
.
5
7
9
 
0
.
3
4
2
 
0
.
7
4
9
 
0
.
6
6
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
O
L
S
.
 
 
H
e
t
e
r
o
s
k
e
d
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
-
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
e
n
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
 
(
*
*
)
 
(
*
*
*
)
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
1
0
%
 
(
5
%
)
 
(
1
%
)
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
 
 
2
5 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
3
:
 
 
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
E
x
p
l
a
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
l
o
g
(
D
i
s
b
u
r
s
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
p
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
)
 
 
(
1
)
 
(
2
)
 
(
3
)
 
(
4
)
 
(
5
)
 
(
6
)
 
(
7
)
 
 
T
i
m
e
 
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
l
o
g
(
G
D
P
 
P
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
)
 
 
 
 
-
0
.
0
3
2
 
 
0
.
0
9
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
1
2
6
)
 
 
(
0
.
1
1
5
)
 
 
 
l
o
g
(
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
)
 
 
 
 
-
0
.
3
7
4
*
*
*
 
 
-
0
.
2
3
4
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
7
2
)
 
 
(
0
.
0
4
1
)
 
 
 
l
o
g
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
 
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
)
 
0
.
9
8
8
*
*
*
 
0
.
9
1
1
*
*
*
 
0
.
8
7
0
*
*
*
 
0
.
8
7
7
*
*
*
 
0
.
9
7
6
*
*
*
 
0
.
8
1
2
*
*
*
 
0
.
9
8
8
*
*
*
 
 
 
(
0
.
1
8
7
)
 
(
0
.
1
7
5
)
 
(
0
.
1
8
0
)
 
(
0
.
1
8
5
)
 
(
0
.
1
7
5
)
 
(
0
.
2
5
1
)
 
(
0
.
2
3
4
)
 
 
l
o
g
(
T
o
t
a
l
 
I
D
A
 
D
e
b
t
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
/
G
D
P
)
 
0
.
2
1
1
*
*
 
0
.
1
1
3
 
0
.
1
3
6
 
0
.
4
1
3
*
*
*
 
0
.
5
0
7
*
*
*
 
0
.
3
2
2
*
*
*
 
0
.
2
3
6
*
*
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
8
5
)
 
(
0
.
0
7
9
)
 
(
0
.
0
9
4
)
 
(
0
.
0
8
5
)
 
(
0
.
1
1
2
)
 
(
0
.
0
7
6
)
 
(
0
.
1
0
2
)
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
 
0
.
1
4
2
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
o
n
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
 
S
t
a
t
u
s
 
 
(
0
.
0
3
9
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
E
n
t
r
y
 
i
n
t
o
 
N
o
n
-
 
 
 
0
.
3
0
2
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
 
S
t
a
t
u
s
 
 
 
(
0
.
1
0
5
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
E
x
i
t
 
f
r
o
m
 
N
o
n
-
 
 
 
0
.
0
1
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
 
S
t
a
t
u
s
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
6
0
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
R
a
n
k
 
A
m
o
n
g
 
I
D
A
 
 
 
 
 
-
0
.
0
0
4
*
 
-
0
.
0
0
8
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
e
b
t
o
r
s
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
 
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
 
 
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
D
u
m
m
y
 
f
o
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
0
.
0
2
7
 
-
0
.
0
3
1
 
 
 
 
G
o
o
d
 
P
o
l
i
c
y
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
6
1
)
 
(
0
.
0
7
1
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y
e
a
r
 
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
1
0
9
8
 
1
0
9
8
 
1
0
9
8
 
1
1
3
7
 
1
1
3
7
 
1
1
3
7
 
1
1
3
7
 
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
8
0
 
8
0
 
8
0
 
8
0
 
8
0
 
8
0
 
8
0
 
 
R
-
S
q
u
a
r
e
d
 
0
.
6
3
1
 
0
.
6
4
1
 
0
.
6
4
0
 
0
.
4
2
6
 
0
.
6
5
2
 
0
.
4
1
1
 
0
.
6
3
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
O
L
S
.
 
 
H
e
t
e
r
o
s
k
e
d
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
-
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
e
n
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
 
(
*
*
)
 
(
*
*
*
)
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
1
0
%
 
(
5
%
)
 
(
1
%
)
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
 
2
6 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
4
:
 
 
I
s
 
D
e
f
e
n
s
i
v
e
 
L
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
D
o
n
e
 
T
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
P
o
l
i
c
y
 
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
?
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
I
D
A
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
 
(
1
)
 
(
2
)
 
(
3
)
 
(
4
)
 
(
5
)
 
(
6
)
 
(
7
)
 
(
8
)
 
T
i
m
e
 
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
u
l
e
 
o
f
 
L
a
w
 
1
.
0
1
3
*
*
*
 
0
.
4
2
4
*
 
1
.
0
1
6
*
*
*
 
0
.
4
4
8
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
1
2
6
)
 
(
0
.
2
4
5
)
 
(
0
.
1
2
5
)
 
(
0
.
2
4
6
)
 
 
 
 
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
 
 
 
 
1
.
4
0
6
*
*
*
 
1
.
0
1
2
*
*
*
 
1
.
4
0
1
*
*
*
 
1
.
0
0
8
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
9
0
)
 
(
0
.
1
5
8
)
 
(
0
.
0
9
1
)
 
(
0
.
1
6
1
)
 
l
o
g
(
T
o
t
a
l
 
I
D
A
 
D
e
b
t
/
G
D
P
)
 
 
-
0
.
0
4
7
 
-
0
.
1
4
0
 
 
 
0
.
0
0
2
 
0
.
0
3
3
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
5
4
)
 
(
0
.
2
0
1
)
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
3
6
)
 
(
0
.
1
6
8
)
 
 
 
l
o
g
(
T
o
t
a
l
 
I
D
A
 
D
e
b
t
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
/
G
D
P
)
 
 
 
-
0
.
0
4
4
 
0
.
0
1
3
 
 
 
-
0
.
0
1
5
 
-
0
.
0
1
2
 
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
4
4
)
 
(
0
.
0
9
7
)
 
 
 
(
0
.
0
3
1
)
 
(
0
.
0
8
0
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y
e
a
r
 
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
Y
e
s
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
N
o
 
Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
Y
e
s
 
N
o
 
Y
e
s
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
3
2
4
 
3
2
4
 
3
2
4
 
3
2
4
 
3
3
3
 
3
3
3
 
3
3
3
 
3
3
3
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
7
5
 
7
5
 
7
5
 
7
5
 
7
5
 
7
5
 
7
5
 
7
5
 
R
-
S
q
u
a
r
e
d
 
0
.
3
6
4
 
0
.
7
0
9
 
0
.
3
6
4
 
0
.
7
0
8
 
0
.
5
9
8
 
0
.
7
6
8
 
0
.
5
9
9
 
0
.
7
6
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
O
L
S
.
 
 
H
e
t
e
r
o
s
k
e
d
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
-
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
e
n
t
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
 
(
*
*
)
 
(
*
*
*
)
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
1
0
%
 
(
5
%
)
 
(
1
%
)
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
 
 
2
7